Democrats’ landslide victory in the midterm elections could increase the likelihood that the next Congress passes legislation reining in President Donald Trump’s tariffs. Although any legislation would require two-thirds majorities from both the House of Representatives and Senate to overcome the president’s likely veto, Nov. 3’s results could open the door to more defections by congressional Republicans.
Courts could continue to provide a more meaningful check to the president’s tariffs, given that overriding a veto remains a high bar that is rarely cleared. Additionally, Democrats in key committees appear poised to investigate the president’s tariff policies, trade deals and tariff exemptions.
Election Results and Veto Override Dynamics
As of publication, the Associated Press projects that Democrats have won 54 Senate seats with two races – Alaska and Mississippi – still uncalled. Although the final results for the House could take days, AP says Democrats have won 234 seats so far. NBC News estimates that Democrats could finish with at least 258 seats.
Such results mean about 13 Republican senators would have to join a unanimous Democratic-bloc to reach the 67 votes needed to override the president’s veto. The Senate would also need 60 votes to clear a Senate filibuster. If the estimates for the House come to fruition, approximately 30 Republicans would need to join Democrats to exceed the two-thirds threshold – 290 seats out of 435 (assuming full attendance).
A veto override remains a high bar. Over the last two years, congressional Republicans have largely voted against Democratic measures to roll back the president’s tariffs, with a handful of exceptions. In the current Congress, Republican leadership has also shielded Republicans from having to vote on Democratic bills to repeal Trump’s tariffs, but Democrats in the next Congress could force Republicans to take more votes on the record. Last night’s results could set the stage for further Republican defections in the coming two years.
The Democratic sweep results could prompt the administration to cut deals with Congress on tariff authorities. Democrats could push for tariff limits if the White House needs congressional approval for substantive changes to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, which is under renegotiation. House Democrats approved Trump’s initial changes to the North American trade pact in 2019. It is also possible Democrats seek to put tariffs on the negotiating table during talks over government funding or the debt ceiling.
Alternatively, a Democratic-controlled Capitol could spur the president to flex his delegated powers to implement tariffs, including under pending section 301 and section 232 tariff investigations.
Possible Democratic Agenda and Pending Legal Challenges
Democrats, including House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries, D-N.Y., likely the next Speaker of the House, today called for reining in the president’s delegated authorities over tariffs.
Today, Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., who is poised to chair the Senate Finance Committee in January, said reining in Trump’s tariffs was a key part of his agenda. Specifically, Wyden said he plans to use his committee perch to “reassert congressional authority over our country’s trade policy to bring down costs, end Trump’s disastrous and corrupt tariffs, reestablish critical trade partnerships, and hold trade cheats accountable.”
Democratic lawmakers are largely opposed to the president’s tariffs but they do not hold monolithic views on import duties. While Wyden calls for reining in the president’s tariff powers, Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., has called for targeted tariffs to help workers, and Rep. Chris Deluzio, D-Pa., supports some tariffs to help revitalize “rust-belt” areas. Former Sen. Sherrod Brown, who won the Senate race in Ohio, is a free trade skeptic but disapproves of the Trump 2.0 tariff regime.
After the Supreme Court struck down the tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, the president relied on section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a stopgap 10% global tariff before rolling out 10%-12.5% forced-labor tariffs on most major trading partners under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
The U.S. Trade Representative is also conducting separate section 301 “structural excess capacity” tariff investigations on 16 of the largest U.S. trading partners as well as several additional country-specific section 301 investigations. Those investigations remain pending and the USTR could announce new tariffs before the end of the year.
The president has also continued collecting product-specific national security tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on metals, autos, trucks, timber, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals and polysilicon. The president has opted for negotiations over pending Section 232 robotics, wind turbines and critical minerals while an investigation into medical devices remains pending.
Democrats could try to advance legislation to restrict the president’s use of section 301, which the administration increasingly relies upon. A test case, one of several challenges, on the legality of the section 301 forced-labor duties is currently pending before the U.S. Court of International Trade, or CIT. At a recent hearing, the CIT grilled the Trump administration on what specific provision of section 301 it relied upon.
Any new section 301 tariffs under pending “structural excess capacity” investigations would also likely draw legal challenges from importers and Democratic state attorneys general. The CIT and appellate courts previously affirmed the legality of the section 301 tariffs on China that Trump imposed during his first term.
Congressional Democrats could try to pass legislation to repeal the 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods under section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. An importer recently asked the CIT to block these tariffs, arguing that Congress “impliedly repealed” the almost-100-year-old statute when it passed subsequent legislation such as section 301. Trump recently modified the list of items subject to section 338 tariffs to help Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, who lost her re-election bid.
Democrats could also target section 122, which putatively allows an up to 15% tariff for 150 days to address balance-of-payments deficits. Republican leaders did not hold a vote on extending the section 122 tariffs before they expired in July. Democratic lawmakers could seek to pass legislation preventing the president from revisiting section 122 in the future. The CIT previously deemed Trump’s use of section 122 illegal. The ruling is subject to an appeal pending at the Federal Circuit.
Trump’s section 232 national security tariffs are on stronger legal footing and have not drawn many legal challenges in Trump’s second term. Democrats in 2025 proposed legislation that would require Congress to affirmatively approve new section 232 tariffs, which they could revisit in the next Congress.
Other Oversight Priorities
Regardless of the success of any legislative proposals, Democrats on the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee appear poised to investigate and hold hearings on the impacts of these tariffs on domestic prices. Democrats could probe the Trump administration’s tariff exemptions and favorable treatment in trade deals.
Democrats could also launch inquiries into the Trump administration’s handling of the $166 billion of IEEPA tariff refunds, which could serve as a guide for future refunds if other tariffs are voided. The Trump administration recently informed the CIT that it had accepted $137.9 billion in potential and certified IEEPA refunds and had certified $127.7 billion during the six-month period after the refund program went live. However, the Trump administration has slow-walked refunds for a subset of importers with “finally liquidated entries.”
Earlier this year, Wyden requested information from some Wall Street firms on IEEPA refund claims trading.
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